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Abstract: In sub-national governments, elected public officers can exercise considerable 
influence on the regulation of local water services, in such ways as, for example, 
contributing to the design of local regulatory institutions, to the formulation of tariff rules, 
and to the supervision of water firms. Relatively little we know, however, about how 
elected public officers think about the regulation of local water services. This Q 
methodology study provides some evidence of the variety of opinions held on how local 
water services are delivered, how well they perform, and how they should be regulated 
among elected public officers in local governments in Italy. The study shows that the 
policy discourse on water regulation in Italy is highly fragmented into alternative and 
partially conflicting views. These findings bear some relevance for better understanding 
sources of stability and change of water regulatory regimes at the local level. 
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1. Introduction 
The regulation of local water services typically leaves considerable room for agency by elected 
public officers, who are able to shape, and sometimes to determine, the institutional design for the 
provision of local water services. For instance, elected public officers contribute to deliberations 
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concerning whether local water services should be delivered by local government owned firms or 
tendered out to business firms that are subjected to the terms and conditions stipulated in concession or 
franchise contracts. More generally, elected public officers exercise political discretion over aspects of 
the design of the regulatory system for local water services that have important consequences for the 
performance of water firms, the quality of water services, and the regime of transparency and 
accountability of water service providers. However, what understanding of the regulation of local 
water services do elected public officers have, and how can we access and analyse such understandings? 
Within the area of study of regulation, the issue of how elected public officers understand the 
regulation of public services in general has been relatively little researched so far. In part, the lack of 
interest towards individuals’  understanding of the regulation of public services can be explained by the 
secondary role that individual beliefs and opinions have within economic theories of regulation. In the 
“public interest” theories of regulation, individuals who hold public authority positions are typically 
assumed to supply regulation taking into account the interest of the society [1–3]. In the “private 
interest” or “capture” theories of regulation, individuals are assumed to rationally pursue their own 
interest, especially in the form of transfer of wealth or attainment of rent positions through the 
formulation of fitting regulations [4–6]. In both these streams of theoretical work, individuals’ 
understandings of regulation and of the regulatory scenario are not problematic. Rather, attention is 
primarily placed on how individuals’  objectives are achieved and what are the performance effects of 
the regulatory choices made. 
The role of individuals’  understanding of the regulation of public services is also relatively silent in 
the emerging theory of mechanism design of regulatory policy. Recent works highlighted that the 
principles of mechanism design [7–10] can inform the solution of social problems such as  
the regulation of infrastructure [11,12]. Building on this approach, Araral [13] argued that a  
“second-generation” research agenda on policy design should focus on the role of incentive compatible 
(self-enforcing) mechanisms, especially in the context of developing countries where regulatory 
capacity is weak, unaccountable, corrupted, or not credible. While greater attention towards the role of 
mechanisms in minimising transaction costs is welcome, also this approach papers over the possibility 
that individuals may hold different understandings of regulation and the regulatory scenario and  
that they may react differently to the incentive structures on the basis of such different belief or 
opinion premises. 
Differently from the theoretical approaches briefly reviewed thus far, other streams of research 
highlight the role of individuals’  ideas  in the political economy of regulation. For example, Lodge and 
Wegrich [14] argued that individuals are inclined to favour alternative principles of regulatory design 
depending on their cultural orientation [15]. Individuals who lean towards “individualistic” values tend 
to advocate market-based mechanisms of regulation, those who hold “egalitarian” values grant 
primacy to transparency and accountability, those who embrace “hierarchical” values prefer 
centralised command-and-control styles of guidance, and those who cling to “fatalistic” values grant 
some merits to randomised checks and other accidental forms of regulation. According to this view, 
individuals’   beliefs and opinions towards the regulation of public services are shaped by cultural 
factors no less than the canons of instrumental rationality in the pursue of individual objectives. 
How do elected public officers think that the regulation of local water services should be designed? 
How do they take the interests of different stakeholders into account in their understanding of the 
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“public interest” associated with the provision of water services? How do cultural factors influence—if 
they do—their  understanding  of  the  ‘public  interest’  in this particular policy domain? These issues are 
important because elected public officers hold relevant positions within the political arenas where 
deliberations over the regulation of local water services delivery systems are made. In addition, they 
call for the investigation of the kind of beliefs and opinions held by elected public officers. Elected 
public officers may be reasonably expected to declare to care about pursuing the public interest in the 
open political discourse. However, they also hold a particular understanding of what constitutes the 
public interest that is reflected in the kind of regulatory design principles and choices that they advocate. 
The aims of the paper, accordingly, is to contribute to research on the regulation of local water services 
by investigating the subjectivities of elected public officers, i.e., the ideas that they hold about how 
local water services are delivered, how well they perform, and how they should be regulated. 
The paper provides, first, a review of the literature on the design of local water regulatory systems, 
with focused attention placed on alternative regulatory design principles (i.e., regulation through 
private contracts, regulation through concession contracts, discretionary regulation, and regulation 
through public enterprises) and regulatory design choices. Section 3 will outline the research design 
and illustrate how Q methodology provides a helpful tool for investigating the subjectivities of elected 
public officers. The approach is consistent with the one followed in other scholarly works that aimed to 
identify typologies of roles of individuals (e.g., policy analyst and public managers) through the 
empirical identification of their subjective viewpoints. Section 4 will illustrate the results from the 
analysis. Section 5 will discuss the results of the analysis and provide some tentative identification of 
subjectivities of elected public officers towards the regulation of local water services. Finally, the 
conclusions will discuss the contribution of the study to the research on the regulation of local  
water services. 
2. Ideas about the Regulation of Local Water Services 
Regulation of water services is a relatively large area of scholarly inquiry. Several works have been 
done on the design of water regulatory systems [16–23], on the assessment of water regulatory 
institutions [24–28] and on the making and implementation of regulatory reforms in the water  
sector [29–32]. The present study is especially concerned with ideas about the regulation of water 
services at the local level. 
The role of ideas in the policy process, as a general kind of phenomenon, has been widely 
researched but it remains somehow controversial. Some scholars argue that ideas (in the forms of 
cognitive paradigms, world views, norms, beliefs, opinions, frames, and policy programmes), rather 
than self-interest, exert a significant influence on policy-making outcomes [33,34]. Others, instead, 
hold that ideas play a minor role in the policy process with respect to institutions and structures that 
orient the conduct of individuals [35]. If ideas matter in the policy process, a great deal of theoretical 
and empirical work is needed in order to clarify how exactly they come into play in shaping the issues 
at stake, the policy agenda, the policy alternatives and the selection of policy options within 
historically specific political discourses and institutional venues for political deliberation. 
One way for ideas to play a role in the regulation of local water services is through the agency of 
elected public officers of local governments. Local governments typically enjoy some discretion in the 
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design of regulatory institutions and in the arrangement of regulatory systems for the delivery of local 
water supply and sanitation services. In France, for example, municipalities can decide whether to 
contract out the provision of water services to business firms selected through tender offer 
competitions or to retain the management of water services within municipal departments. Ideas, 
especially in the form of beliefs and opinions about how local water services are delivered, how well 
they perform, and how they should be regulated, can play an important role in determining the 
inclination of elected public officers who sit in municipal councils towards the desired configuration of 
the system of water service provision within the municipality. Anecdotal evidence from the cases of 
“remunicipalisation” of water service provision (e.g., in Grenoble in 2001 and in Paris in 2010) 
suggests that, indeed, ideas may contribute determining policy reversals under conditions of seemingly 
stable institutional arrangements. 
Ideas about the regulation of local water services typically include the belief that water service 
provision should be subjected to economic regulation, especially because of the natural monopoly 
features of water infrastructure. These features include, in particular, the role of economies of scale 
that produce advantages for larger operators, of network economies that benefit operators of larger 
infrastructure networks, and of the presence of durable and immobile assets that discourage entry from 
potential competitors [36]. Relatively less consensus exists, however, on how precisely water services 
should be regulated. Generic policy options typically include regulating the water services provided by 
business companies through independent regulatory authorities (such as OFWAT in England and 
Wales), or through franchise contracts (as it is often done in France), or through the retention of water 
services under full public ownership and control (as it is often the case in Germany and Italy) or under 
semi-privatised water utilities (i.e., mixed public-private ownership firms). More specifically, policy 
options include various ways for regulating tariffs (e.g., through price-cap mechanism, or rate-of-return, 
or other formulas), financing investments (e.g., through water charges or public funds), stimulating 
investments and service improvements (e.g., through contractual standards or benchmarking practices), 
and so on. 
Issues related to the regulation of water services are especially sensitive at the local level. Actors of 
local water industries are typically embedded within dense networks of social relationships, which 
entail potential conflicts of interests between duties and responsibilities attached to organisational roles 
on the one hand, and partisan views and inclinations related to personal ties on the other one [37]. 
Mechanisms of “revolving doors” [38–40], for example, may blur the boundaries between the roles 
attached to positions within local authorities, regulators, and water utilities. Elected public officers 
may possess a complex understanding of the issues related to the regulation of water services that 
includes careful consideration for the diverse interests and expectations held by various stakeholders of 
the local water industries. Access to the understanding of elected public officers, therefore, may shed 
some light onto the repertoire of ideas that populate the policy discourse on the regulation of local 
water services. 
Ideas on the regulation of local water services may be articulated along several dimensions. A 
tentative, a priori, classification includes ideas about (a) the normative stance towards values that 
should be protected, including a position about the allocation of costs and benefits between users and 
taxpayers and between generations; (b) the general regulatory design principles that should be 
followed; (c) initial conditions that characterise the present state of affairs in the local water industry; 
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(d) process conditions that relate to features of the conduct of the regulatory process; and (e) context 
conditions that relate to features of environmental circumstances. These dimensions provide a frame of 
reference for classifying and analysing the subjectivities of elected public officers with respect to the 
topic of local water services regulation. In other words, ideas held along these dimensions form “policy 
views” that elected public officers hold on the topic under consideration. The analysis of these policy 
views can reveal whether elected public officers share a mutual understanding of the regulation of 
local water services or whether they hold different positions on how local water services are delivered, 
how well they perform, and how they should be regulated. 
Of course, ideas on the regulation of local water services should be understood as participating in 
contextually located political discourses. In principle, it is not possible to assert whether ideas tend to 
align with any dominant, or even hegemonic, policy programme or whether they tend to reflect diverse 
positions within a fragmented and discordant policy arena. It is plausible to argue, however, that ideas 
on the regulation of local water services are strategically formulated and expressed on the basis of 
actors’  understanding of the political economy of the regulation of local water services. For example, 
some beliefs and opinions may relate to policy views that tend to protect the interests of present water 
users, while others may be associated with the interests of taxpayers at large or next generations of 
water users. Evidence provided by the analysis of the subjectivities of elected public officers, 
therefore, should be careful interpreted on the basis of information about the historical context and 
structural features of the water policy domain that actors participate to. 
Understanding the subjectivities towards water regulation is relevant for arguing about the 
inclinations that individuals have towards water regulatory institutions and policies. For example, 
individuals who hold beliefs and opinions that are congruent with the design principles of existing 
regulatory institutions may be predisposed to preserve the present institutional arrangements, while 
those whose beliefs and opinions contrast with the performance or distributional effects of the existing 
regulatory regime may be oriented towards advocating and effecting change of the present regulatory 
institutions. Individuals’  beliefs and opinions, therefore, may play the role of a component factor of 
explanatory arguments for stability and change of regulatory institutions and service delivery systems. 
3. Research Design 
This study broadly follows an “interpretive” approach to the study of social phenomena, i.e., one 
that grants primacy to detecting   and   understanding   individuals’   beliefs, preferences, meanings and 
reasons for acting rather than to focusing on the institutional and organisational aspects of the social 
domain under consideration. Research on the regulation of local water services calls for such kind of 
approach. Elected public officers play an important role in the making of local regulatory policies that 
includes, for example, the selection of the regulatory design principles, the formulation of tariff rules, 
and the supervision of water firms. An inquiry into their subjectivities seems important, therefore, to 
better understand how they frame water regulation problems, how they search and assess alternative 
regulatory tools, and how they make decisions about the design of local water regulatory systems. 
Investigating individuals’  beliefs and opinions towards the regulation of local water services poses a 
significant methodological challenge. How can we access such subjectivities? Standard methodologies 
such as semi-structured interviews and surveys do not really retrieve the inner worlds of individuals, 
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especially because they may not adequately capture the nuances of alternative regulatory design 
principles and choices or the relative importance that individuals grant to alternative normative views. 
Individuals’  beliefs and opinions, however, can be investigated by using the so-called Q methodology, 
a technique that helps identifying the patterns of subjective perspectives held by a group of 
interviewees [41,42]. The technique has been applied in various fields, including the governance of 
public networks [43] and public service co-production [44]. In this study, the methodology is applied 
to answer the question of what are the beliefs and opinions of elected public officers towards the 
regulation of local water services. 
Q methodology is often regarded as a way to access and measure human subjectivity [41,42]. 
Unlike other forms of quantitative analysis, the technique is not intended to test hypothesised causal 
relationships and the results of the analysis are subjected to the interpretive skills of the researcher. 
Dissimilarly from other forms of qualitative research, moreover, Q methodology provides the 
researcher a statistical basis for inferring associations between claims and therefore supporting the 
interpretation of alternative viewpoints on the issue under consideration. This research methodology, 
then, is consistent with the interpretive approach that is followed here and with the scholarly aspiration 
of making the analysis of empirical data transparent and systematic [45]. In broad terms, the 
methodology is applied by making each participant of a population sample (called P sample) sort a 
series of statements (called Q sample) that is representative of the variety of claims around an issue 
(the so-called concourse) into a distribution of preferences (called Q sort). Statistical analysis, then, 
allows to derive significant factors that are subjected to interpretation of the researcher. 
Q methodology is generally implemented through five different stages. First, the technique provides 
the construction of the so-called “concourse”, i.e., the breadth of the debate around a particular  
topic. This task can be accomplished in various means, such as interviews with highly informed  
participants [46], focus groups [47], analysis of textual and other media resources [48], or a 
combination of these. Second, the researchers survey the concourse in search for as many sentences 
that are believed to adequately convey the variety of beliefs and opinions about the topic under 
consideration. The statements (which may number into the hundreds) should make use of the same 
lexicon as the one of the empirical field under consideration (i.e., the “emic” knowledge of the 
individuals; [49]). Third, these statements are reduced to a manageable size (between about 30 and 60) 
to form the Q sample. The reason for the reduction from the sentences of the concourse to those of the 
Q sample primarily is a practical one, provided that interviewees may not possess the time or will to 
sort too many sentences. The construction of the Q sample is generally driven by a theoretical or an 
argumentative framework, which provides the criteria for arranging the sentences into a limited 
number of categories. Various techniques may help in this task, especially including the use of matrix 
tables to distinguish types of statements and discard duplicates. Fourth, a sample of individuals is 
purposively selected (in the number of between about 25 and 75) among the population of participants 
to the discourse about the topic under consideration. The P sample is not intended to be representative 
of the population, in the sense that the results from the analysis conducted on the basis of the evidence 
collected from the sample should be generalizable to the population. Rather, the P sample is 
constructed with the aim of gathering as much variety as possible of views about the topic under 
consideration on the basis of a priori knowledge and assumptions about the population and its 
relationship with the concourse. Fifth, the participants sort the statements of the Q sample into three 
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piles (depending on whether they agree, disagree, or are neutral with the claims) and then they refine 
the sort by placing the statements into a forced half-normal distribution, that typically is represented as 
an inverted pyramid made of “slots” arranged along a scale (i.e., from −4 to +4 or from −5 to +5). The 
grid forces the participants to make hard choices to rank the order of statements relative to each other, 
rather than purely expressing the extent to which they agree or not (i.e., as it would be normally done 
in a questionnaire survey). Finally, the responses (Q sorts) are analysed through a by-person factor 
analysis [41] to reveal correlated groups of statement preferences. The researcher, eventually, 
interprets the meaning of the synthesised factors on the basis of the correlated statements. Factors, in 
this sense, identify groups of claims that can be related to particular “worldviews” held by respondents. 
The present study builds on the analysis of empirical evidence collected among elected public 
officers of local governments in Italy. The selection of the country case deserves some remarks. Water 
service provision in Italy was largely conducted by full public ownership firms in the past, until a 
reform of the water sector in 1994 [50] mandated the reorganisation of the water governance system, 
introduced novel regulatory institutions and tools, and paved the way for the partial privatisation of the 
water industry. A stream of reforms of local public services between 2001 and 2008 [51–54], 
moreover, entailed the gradual opening of the water sector to private operators and investors, which 
was eventually halted by a referendum in 2011 that resulted in the abrogation of legislative provisions 
about the tender out of water concessions and the inclusion of a return to investment in water charges. 
At the time of this study, these reforms resulted in heterogeneous forms of water service regulation 
across the country. Most water utilities were retained under public sector ownership, while others were 
partially privatised or floated in the Milan stock exchange. More importantly, for the sake of this study, 
the making and implementation of these reforms were accompanied by the emergence of contrasting 
arguments within the domestic policy discourse, which included both support towards the re-regulation 
and privatisation of the water sector (especially from the side of the financial sector and municipal 
government coalitions that embraced privatisation) and acrimony against the “marketisation” (as it was 
occasionally put) of water services. 
The present regulatory regime for water services in Italy is heterogeneous across the country. About 
two-thirds of the water industry still consists of utilities owned and controlled by local governments, 
albeit they have been typically re-incorporated under company laws rather than left operating as 
municipal agencies or departments [32]. In the rest of the water industry, utilities are owned by both 
local governments and private operators and investors, that include, for instance, French water 
multinational firms, local banks, and financial investors. The provision of water services is typically 
regulated through concession contracts that stipulate infrastructure development, quality standards, and 
tariff. Whatever the particular configuration of the local water industry, local governments play a 
pivotal role. Where water utilities are owned by local governments, elected public officers may have 
diverse views as to whether the present arrangement is advantageous with respect to any form of 
involvement of private actors or whether full public ownership entails that the water utilities have 
limited capacity to cope with growing pressures to infrastructure development and increase of 
efficiency and service quality. Where water utilities are jointly owned by local governments and 
private operators and investors, elected public officers may be variously inclined towards the extent to 
which the water utilities should pursue of the interests of the private partners with respect to those of 
the local communities. Features of the particular water governance and regulatory regime, therefore, 
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seem important to account for the possibility that elected public officers hold the variety views towards 
the regulation of water services that this study is set to investigate. 
The presumed variety of views about how local water services are delivered, how well they 
perform, and how they should be regulated may be related to several kinds of conditions. Members of 
coalition governments that decided to re-regulate and privatise water service provision within their 
municipality, for example, may be favourably inclined towards these policies. Members of minority 
parties or members of coalition governments that resisted privatisation, instead, may lean towards 
alternative or opposite policy positions. Apart from party affiliation, moreover, individuals’  beliefs and 
opinions may relate to their value systems, their ties with local communities, and their understanding 
of issues related to the development and management of the water technical system. In addition, 
individuals may hold partially conflicting or contradicting views about component parts of the whole 
regulatory system, such as, for instance, beliefs and opinions about the desirability of alternative 
regulatory tools and of alternative forms of privatisation. The question as to what elected public 
officers of local governments in Italy think about the regulation of local water services, therefore, is 
open to empirical investigation. 
This study begun with the development of a concourse of about 150 statements about the regulation 
of local water services that had emerged from documentary sources and from about 20 interviews with 
elected public officers of both the national and local government level, water regulators, water utility 
managers, and mayors that were collected in previous research on water regulation and regulatory 
reform in Italy [30–32] (i.e., the concourse was formed by identifying claims about how local water 
services are delivered, how well they perform, and how they should be regulated as expressed by 
interviewees in the course of previous fieldworks). Then, the number of statements of the concourse 
was reduced to a Q sample made of 30 claims that related to five convenient a priori categories of 
features about the regulation of water services. The five categories originated from the distinction, 
drawn from argumentation theory, between descriptive, normative, advocative claims, where the 
descriptive claims are further detailed into claims about initial conditions, context conditions, and 
process conditions about the working of the present regulatory system. The reduction of the number of 
statements into the five categories was primarily conducted by discarding statements whose meanings 
were understood as broadly corresponding to those of other statements that were preserved in the Q 
sample. Admittedly, this process entailed that some statements were discarded although they contained 
some nuances that were not completely incorporated in the remaining statements of the Q sample. The 
simplification of the set of statements that were considered adequate to represent the variety of beliefs 
and opinions about the regulation of local water services was justified, however, on the basis of the 
practical concern with constructing a Q sample of manageable size for the sorting exercise. The 
resulting Q sample is shown in Table 1. As statements were originally formulated in Italian, the reader 
should be warned that the English translation that is presented here may not completely convey the 
meaning that the elected public officers could have attributed to the original sentences. As a way to 
partially address this issue, Table 1 also contains (in brackets) the original formulation of the sentences 
in Italian. In addition, the discussion of the results of the analysis will pay attention to how the original 
formulation of the sentences in Italian could have been understood by elected public officers rather 
than the English corresponding translation. 
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Table 1. The Q sample. 
Normative stance Design principles Initial conditions Process conditions Context conditions 
Water services should be managed 
according to managerial principles 
akin to those of for-profit firms. 
(I servizi idrici dovrebbero essere 
gestiti secondo principi manageriali 
simili a quelli delle imprese che 
operano per il profitto.) 
Local water services should be 
provided by business firms 
subjected to the pressure of market 
competition only. 
(I servizi idrici dovrebbero essere 
erogati da imprese private soggette 
alle sole pressioni della 
concorrenza.)  
Local public authorities do not 
possess adequate knowledge, 
competences, and capabilities to 
regulate the conduct of water firms. 
(Le autorità pubbliche locali non 
hanno adeguate conoscenze, 
competenze e capacità per regolare 
la condotta delle aziende idriche.) 
Local public authorities care more 
about protecting the interests of water 
firms than of the users. 
(Le autorità pubbliche locali tutelano 
più gli interessi delle aziende idriche 
che degli utenti.) 
Local public authorities tend to 
interfere in the management of water 
firms rather than supervising and 
regulating their conduct. 
(Le autorità pubbliche locali tendono a 
interferire nella gestione delle aziende 
idriche piuttosto che supervisionare e 
regolare la loro condotta.) 
Water services should be managed 
according to principles of solidarity 
and of protection of the most 
vulnerable users. 
(I servizi idrici dovrebbero essere 
gestiti secondo principi di 
solidarietà e di tutela delle fasce più 
deboli dell'utenza.) 
Local water services should be 
provided by business firms 
subjected to the discretion of a 
regulatory agency. 
(I servizi idrici dovrebbero essere 
erogati da imprese private soggette 
al controllo discrezionale 
dell’autorità  di  regolazione.) 
The water sector contains too few 
firms to stimulate any form of 
competition. 
(Il settore idrico contiene troppe 
poche aziende per stimolare alcuna 
forma di concorrenza.) 
In the tender offer of franchise 
contracts, water firms tend to collude 
rather than compete. 
(Nelle gare per l'assegnazione delle 
concessioni per la gestione del servizio, 
le aziende idriche tendono a colludere 
tra di loro invece di farsi concorrenza.) 
Water firms are not exposed to any 
serious threat of new entrants into the 
industry. 
(Le aziende idriche non sono esposte ad 
alcuna seria minaccia di nuovi entranti  
nel settore.) 
Water tariffs should cover full cost, 
including a fair return to capital 
invested. 
(Le tariffe dei servizi idrici 
dovrebbero coprire il costo pieno, 
comprendendo  un’equa  
remunerazione del capitale 
investito.) 
Local water services should be 
provided by business firms 
subjected to terms and conditions of 
franchise contracts. 
(I servizi idrici dovrebbero essere 
erogati da imprese private soggette 
ai termini e alle condizioni del 
contratto di concessione.) 
The attainment of profit bears 
negative effects on the quality of 
water services. 
(Il perseguimento del profitto 
condiziona negativamente la qualità 
dei servizi idrici.) 
If water services are provided by 
franchisees, water firms tend not to 
completely comply with contractual 
obligations. 
(Se il servizio idrico è gestito da 
aziende concessionarie, queste tendono 
a non rispettare completamente gli 
obblighi contrattuali di servizio.) 
Water services provide an attractive 
opportunity for private investors. 
(I servizi idrici costituiscono 
un’attraente  opportunità  per  gli  
investitori privati.) 
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Table 1. Cont. 
Normative stance Design principles Initial conditions Process conditions Context conditions 
Water tariffs should be kept under 
the control of public authorities to 
ensure affordability. 
(Le tariffe dei servizi idrici 
dovrebbero essere tenute sotto il 
controllo delle autorità pubbliche 
per garantirne l'accessibilità.) 
Local water services should be 
provided by mixed public-private 
ownership firms. 
(I servizi idrici dovrebbero essere 
erogati da aziende a proprietà mista 
pubblica e privata.) 
In the water sector we lack reliable 
and comparable measures to assess 
the quality of services. 
(Nel settore idrico non si dispone di 
misurazioni affidabili e confrontabili 
che servano per valutare la qualità  
dei servizi.) 
Local public authorities do not 
adequately monitor service quality. 
(Le autorità pubbliche locali non 
tengono sotto osservazione la qualità 
dei servizi in modo adeguato.) 
Users of water services are not able to 
compare the quality of the services with 
those provided by other water firms. 
(Gli utenti dei servizi idrici non sono in 
grado di paragonare la qualità dei 
servizi che ricevono con quella 
provveduta da altre aziende.) 
Water infrastructure development 
should be primarily financed by 
users charges. 
(Lo  sviluppo  dell’infrastruttura  
idrica dovrebbe essere 
principalmente finanziato con le 
tariffe pagate dagli utenti.) 
Local water services should be 
provided by cooperative firms. 
(I servizi idrici dovrebbero essere 
erogati da aziende cooperative.) 
In the tender offer of franchise 
contracts, it is difficult to detail and 
enforce contractual terms and 
conditions. 
(Nelle gare per l'assegnazione delle 
concessioni per la gestione del 
servizio, è molto difficile precisare 
termini e condizioni contrattuali e 
farli rispettare.) 
Renegotiation of water franchise 
contracts is highly demanding in terms 
of time and resources. 
(La rinegoziazione delle concessioni di 
gestione dei servizi idrici è molto 
dispendiosa in termini di tempo e 
risorse.) 
The administrative judicial system plays 
an important role in the regulation of 
water firms.  
(Il sistema giudiziario amministrativo 
svolge un ruolo importante nel regolare 
la condotta delle aziende idriche.) 
Water infrastructure development 
should be primarily financed by 
public funds. 
(Lo  sviluppo  dell’infrastruttura  
idrica dovrebbe essere 
principalmente finanziato da fondi 
pubblici.) 
Local water services should be 
provided by full public ownership 
firms. 
(I servizi idrici dovrebbero essere 
erogati da aziende a totale proprietà 
pubblica.) 
Water firms are inherently inefficient 
because they are monopolists. 
(Le aziende idriche sono 
intrinsecamente inefficienti in quanto 
monopolisti.) 
Water firms tend not to innovate and 
improve the quality of services over 
time. 
(Le aziende idriche tendono a non 
innovare e non migliorare la qualità dei 
loro sevizi nel tempo.) 
Water firms are provided incentives to 
operate efficiently. 
(Le aziende idriche sono incentivate a 
operare con efficienza.) 
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The P sample was composed of elected public officers in local governments in Italy. An invitation 
to participate to the Q methodology survey was sent to a total number of 481 elected public officers  
of 19 municipalities of the country, selected among 135 “middle-range” cities by population, i.e., with 
between 50,000 and 500,000 inhabitants. The 19 municipalities were purposively chosen in order to 
provide variety in terms of both geographical location and mode of water service delivery. The list of 
the municipalities is shown in Table 2. The number of respondents was 24 (5%). By itself, however, 
the relatively small number of respondents does not compromise Q methodology, provided that the P 
sample is usually smaller than the Q sample [55,56]. 
Table 2. List of municipalities whose elected public officers were invited to the Q 
methodology survey [57]. 
Title Municipality Region Inhabitants 
Northern 
Italy 
Bologna Emilia-Romagna 383,577 
Verona Veneto 258,553 
Modena Emilia-Romagna 179,180 
Parma Emilia-Romagna 178,723 
Reggio Emilia Emilia-Romagna 165,001 
Novara Piemonte 102,012 
Cuneo Piemonte 55,613 
Pordenone Friuli Venezia Giulia 51,512 
Central Italy 
Prato Tuscany 187.530 
Terni Umbria 111,792 
Arezzo Tuscany 98,562 
Pisa Tuscany 86,492 
Fano Marche 63,009 
Chieti Abruzzo 51,226 
Southern 
Italy 
Salerno Campania 131,637 
Marsala Sicily 80,564 
Caltanisetta Sicily 75,662 
Caserta Campania 74,838 
Scafati Campania 50,227 
The Q sort was performed through a web application, named FlashQ software [58]. The software 
enabled respondents to sort the statements online by dragging virtual “cards” onto the inverse pyramid 
grid with values ranging from −5 to +5. Respondents were primarily of male gender (21), with average 
age 50.4 years (median 50.5, maximum 67, minimum 30), and with average seven years experience in 
the regulation of local water services (median 5, maximum 20, minimum 1). Respondents declared 
themselves as politically oriented to “right” (RT) parties (2), “centre-right” (CR) (3), “centre” (C) (3), 
“centre-left” (CL) (6), “left” (LF) (6), and “other/independent” (OT) (4) (because of the many and 
diverse parties in local government councils, respondents were requested to state their political 
inclinations rather than the party affiliation). 
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4. Results from the Analysis 
The analysis of the data was conducted with a centroid factor analysis and a varimax rotation using 
PQ method [59]. Various rotations were performed, checking for explained variance and eigenvalue, 
the number of significant persons confounded across more than one factor, and the correlation between 
factors. At the end, five factors were identified. Table 3 shows the factor matrix with defining sorts  
(in bold). Table 4 exhibits the factor Q sort values for each statement. Table 5 provides the correlations 
between factor scores. 
Table 3. Factor matrix with defining sorts (in bold). 
Respondent No. Respondent ID 
Factors 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 CR1 0.3066 −0.0665 0.5351 0.1606 −0.1501 
2 CL1 0.3117 0.3461 0.4480 0.1291 −0.5067 
3 CL2 0.0652 0.1304 0.6083 0.2813 0.1059 
4 C1 0.2396 −0.1540 0.6836 0.2407 −0.1217 
5 LF1 0.3565 0.6346 0.3367 0.2255 0.0480 
6 CL3 −0.0560 0.0601 0.1556 0.0163 0.1611 
7 RT1 0.3671 0.7639 0.0070 0.0214 0.0446 
8 LF2 0.6273 0.1554 0.3089 −0.0863 −0.0713 
9 C2 0.0481 0.2961 −0.0507 0.0444 0.9027 
10 OT1 0.2153 0.0798 0.1132 0.6495 0.1094 
11 LF3 0.7898 0.1444 0.1440 −0.0324 −0.1707 
12 OT2 0.7237 0.1412 0.0435 0.0708 −0.2788 
13 CR1 −0.2277 0.0515 0.0391 0.0688 0.4265 
14 OT3 0.8053 0.3106 0.1547 0.1055 0.0945 
15 LF4 −0.4282 −0.0336 0.1534 0.3831 0.2295 
16 OT4 0.8039 0.1200 0.1104 0.1356 0.0284 
17 CL4 −0.1263 −0.3549 0.2376 0.0078 −0.3511 
18 RT2 0.0516 0.4528 −0.2500 0.1721 0.0091 
19 CR2 0.2216 0.5558 0.1123 0.0046 0.2062 
20 LF5 0.8065 0.0361 0.2702 0.1859 −0.0893 
21 C3 0.1647 0.1793 0.4189 −0.1098 0.0299 
22 CR3 0.2585 −0.1208 −0.0058 0.3498 −0.1032 
23 CL5 0.7229 -0.1483 −0.1830 0.2606 −0.0427 
24 CL6 0.1023 0.1816 0.2093 0.4434 −0.0443 
% explained variance 21 9 9 5 7 
Some of the factors are relatively correlated with each other (e.g., factors 1 and 2, whose  
correlation is 0.4999). The correlation does not negatively affect the results of the analysis, provided 
that—differently from linear regression studies—Q methodology is intended to single out factors that 
are sufficiently distinctive to call for an interpretative effort. The discussion below seeks to construct 
meaningful interpretations of the factors that have been identified in the analysis, also with the support 
of additional evidence provided by qualitative data in the form of comments included by the 
respondents about the statements they agreed and disagreed most with. 
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Table 4. Factor Q sort values for each statement. 
 
Statements 
Factors 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 Water services should be managed according to business principles akin to those of  
for-profit firms. 
−3 −3 2 −5 −2 
2 Water services should be managed according to principles of solidarity and of protection 
of the most vulnerable users. 
4 1 5 5 −1 
3 Water tariffs should cover full cost, including a fair return to capital invested. −4 1 4 −2 0 
4 Water tariffs should be kept under the control of public authorities to ensure 
affordability. 
4 1 4 4 1 
5 Water infrastructure development should be primarily financed by users charges. −1 −4 3 3 −1 
6 Water infrastructure development should be primarily financed by public funds. 2 0 −1 3 −1 
7 Local public authorities care more about protecting the interests of water firms than of 
the users. 
0 2 −4 −2 3 
8 In the tender offer of franchise contracts, water firms tend to collude rather than compete. 1 0 −3 1 1 
9 If water services are provided by franchisees, water firms tend not to completely comply 
with contractual obligations. 
3 2 0 −3 1 
10 Local public authorities do not adequately monitor service quality. 2 3 1 4 0 
11 Renegotiation of water franchise contracts is highly demanding in terms of time and 
resources. 
−3 1 −1 0 −4 
12 Water firms tend not to innovate and improve the quality of services over time. 1 2 3 −1 −2 
13 Local public authorities do not possess adequate knowledge, competences, and 
capabilities to regulate the conduct of water firms. 
−1 3 1 0 3 
14 The water sector contains too few firms to stimulate any form of competition. −2 −2 0 1 1 
15 The attainment of profit bears negative effects on the quality of water services. 3 5 −2 2 −2 
16 In the water sector we lack reliable and comparable measures to assess the quality of services. −1 −1 1 3 2 
17 In the tender offer of franchise contracts, it is difficult to detail and enforce contractual 
terms and conditions. 
0 −1 −3 −3 0 
18 Water firms are inherently inefficient because they are monopolists. 1 −1 −1 −4 0 
19 Local public authorities tend to interfere in the management of water firms rather than 
supervising and regulating their conduct. 
0 4 0 −1 2 
20 Water firms are not exposed to any serious threat of new entrants into the industry. 0 −2 0 1 3 
21 Water services provide an attractive opportunity for private investors. 3 3 1 0 4 
22 Users of water services are not able to compare the quality of the services with those 
provided by other water firms. 
2 0 3 1 2 
23 The administrative judicial system plays an important role in the regulation of water firms.  −1 −3 2 −1 −5 
24 Water firms are provided incentives to operate efficiently. −2 −4 −2 −2 −3 
25 Local water services should be provided by business firms subjected to the pressure of 
market competition only. 
−5 −3 −5 −1 −3 
26 Local water services should be provided by business firms subjected to the discretion of 
a regulatory agency. 
−3 −2 −1 −3 4 
27 Local water services should be provided by business firms subjected to terms and 
conditions of franchise contracts. 
−4 0 −4 2 −1 
28 Local water services should be provided by mixed public-private ownership firms. −2 −1 −2 1 5 
29 Local water services should be provided by cooperative firms. 1 −5 −3 −4 −4 
30 Local water services should be provided by full public ownership firms. 5 4 2 0 −3 
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Table 5. Correlations between factor scores. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
1 1 0.4999 0.3761 0.3301 −0.0263 
2 0.4999 1 0.2324 0.2891 0.2852 
3 0.3761 0.2324 1 0.3693 0.0118 
4 0.3301 0.2891 0.3693 1 0.1430 
5 −0.0263 0.2852 0.0118 0.1430 1 
As a way to make the results of the analysis more accessible, Table 6 exhibits the defining 
statements for each factor, i.e., those statements individuals tend to agree and disagree most. On the 
basis of these defining statements, we can draw tentative interpretations of subjective views about the 
regulation of local water services and attribute speculative “labels” to characterise the kind of 
worldview held by elected public officers. In addition, the analysis reveals that some statements  
(so-called “consensus statements”) do not distinguish between any pair of factors in a statistically 
significant way. The two statements are that “In the tender offer of franchise contracts, it is difficult to 
detail and enforce contractual terms and conditions” (statement 17) and “Users of water services are 
not able to compare the quality of the services with those provided by other water firms” (statement 22). 
Both statements can be understood as factual beliefs or opinions that relate to issues that are generally 
uncontested within the water services domain. 
Table 6. Defining statements for each factor (Z-scores greater than 1 or lower than −1). 
Factor No. 1 Rank Z-score 
Agrees especially with the following statements 
s30 Local water services should be provided by full public ownership firms. 5 2.249 
s2 
Water services should be managed according to principles of solidarity and of protection of the most 
vulnerable users. 
4 1.578 
s4 Water tariffs should be kept under the control of public authorities to ensure affordability. 4 1.499 
s15 The attainment of profit bears negative effects on the quality of water services. 3 1.235 
s21 Water services provide an attractive opportunity for private investors. 3 1.026 
Disagrees especially with the following statements 
s26 Local water services should be provided by business firms subjected to the discretion of a regulatory agency. −3 −1.341 
s27 
Local water services should be provided by business firms subjected to terms and conditions of franchise 
contracts. 
−4 −1.435 
s3 Water tariffs should cover full cost, including a fair return to capital invested. −4 −1.686 
s25 Local water services should be provided by business firms subjected to the pressure of market competition only. −5 −1.894 
Factor No. 2 
Agrees especially with the following statements 
s15 The attainment of profit bears negative effects on the quality of water services. 5 1.592 
s19 
Local public authorities tend to interfere in the management of water firms rather than supervising and 
regulating their conduct. 
4 1.546 
s30 Local water services should be provided by full public ownership firms. 4 1.446 
s10 Local public authorities do not adequately monitor service quality. 3 1.199 
s21 Water services provide an attractive opportunity for private investors. 3 1.152 
s13 
Local public authorities do not possess adequate knowledge, competences, and capabilities to regulate the 
conduct of water firms. 
3 1.052 
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Table 6. Cont. 
Factor No. 2 Rank Z-score 
Disagrees especially with the following statements 
s25 Local water services should be provided by business firms subjected to the pressure of market competition only. −3 −1.538 
s5 Water infrastructure development should be primarily financed by users charges. −4 −1.592 
s24 Water firms are provided incentives to operate efficiently. −4 −1.848 
s29 Local water services should be provided by cooperative firms. −5 −1.894 
Factor No. 3 
Agrees especially with the following statements 
s2 
Water services should be managed according to principles of solidarity and of protection of the most 
vulnerable users. 
5 1.896 
s4 Water tariffs should be kept under the control of public authorities to ensure affordability. 4 1.809 
s3 Water tariffs should cover full cost, including a fair return to capital invested. 4 1.494 
Disagrees especially with the following statements 
s27 
Local water services should be provided by business firms subjected to terms and conditions of franchise 
contracts. 
−4 −1.653 
s7 Local public authorities care more about protecting the interests of water firms than of the users. −4 −1.735 
s25 Local water services should be provided by business firms subjected to the pressure of market competition only. 5 −2.367 
Factor No. 4 
Agrees especially with the following statements 
s2 
Water services should be managed according to principles of solidarity and of protection of the most 
vulnerable users. 
5 2.287 
s4 Water tariffs should be kept under the control of public authorities to ensure affordability. 4 1.679 
s10 Local public authorities do not adequately monitor service quality. 4 1.378 
s5 Water infrastructure development should be primarily financed by users charges. 3 1.071 
s16 In the water sector we lack reliable and comparable measures to assess the quality of services. 3 1.071 
Disagrees especially with the following statements 
s9 
If water services are provided by franchisees, water firms tend not to completely comply with contractual 
obligations. 
−3 −1.523 
s29 Local water services should be provided by cooperative firms. −4 −1.528 
s18 Water firms are inherently inefficient because they are monopolists. −4 −1.679 
s1 Water services should be managed according to business principles akin to those of for-profit firms. −5 −1.986 
Factor No. 5 
Agrees especially with the following statements 
s28 Local water services should be provided by mixed public-private ownership firms. 5 1.923 
s21 Water services provide an attractive opportunity for private investors. 4 1.406 
s26 Local water services should be provided by business firms subjected to the discretion of a regulatory agency. 4 1.406 
s20 Water firms are not exposed to any serious threat of new entrants into the industry. 3 1.162 
s13 
Local public authorities do not possess adequate knowledge, competences, and capabilities to regulate the 
conduct of water firms. 
3 1.123 
s7 Local public authorities care more about protecting the interests of water firms than of the users. 3 1.084 
Disagrees especially with the following statements 
s24 Water firms are provided incentives to operate efficiently. −3 −1.162 
s25 Local water services should be provided by business firms subjected to the pressure of market competition only. −3 −1.201 
s30 Local water services should be provided by full public ownership firms. −3 −1.201 
s11 Renegotiation of water franchise contracts is highly demanding in terms of time and resources. −4 −1.366 
s29 Local water services should be provided by cooperative firms. −4 −1.601 
s23 The administrative judicial system plays an important role in the regulation of water firms. −5 −1.923 
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5. Discussion 
The results of the analysis can be interpreted by recollecting the distinctive sentences associated 
with each factor in meaningful wholes. The first factor can be called a “public sector interventionist” 
view of local water services regulation. Individuals who hold this view agree that water services 
should be provided by full public ownership firms (statement 30), that they should be managed 
according to principles of solidarity and of protection of the most vulnerable users (statement 2), and 
that they should be subjected to tariff controls by public authorities to ensure affordability (statement 4). 
In addition, proponents of this view agree that the water sector provides an attractive opportunity for 
private investors (statement 21), but also that the attainment of profit bears negative effects on the 
quality of water services (statement 15). Proponents of this view would also disagree with the ideas 
that water services should be provided by business firms subjected to the pressure of market 
competition only (statement 25), or subjected to the discretion of a regulatory agency (statement 26), 
or subjected to terms and conditions of franchise contracts (statement 27). Also, they challenge the 
idea that water tariff should cover full cost, including a fair return to capital invested (statement 3). An 
illustration of this view is provided by the following comment: 
“Water   is   a   natural   public   good.   It   is   a   good   from  which   profit   is   unconceivable.  Tariffs   should 
exactly correspond to the operative costs and investments in new infrastructure. Private firms tend to 
make profits because of their very nature, and also public participation in business ventures would 
follow  the  same  logic”  (respondent  No.  20). 
The second factor can be called a “pessimistic” view of local water services regulation. Individuals 
who hold this view agree with statements that highlight unresolved issues with the present regulatory 
process. For example, they agree that the attainment of profit bears negative effects on the quality of 
water services (sentence 15), that local public authorities tend to interfere in the management of water 
firms rather than supervising and regulating their conduct (sentence 19), that local public authorities do 
not adequately monitor service quality (sentence 10), that local public authorities do not possess 
adequate knowledge, competences, and capabilities to regulate the conduct of water firms (statement 13). 
As a matter of policy inclination, individuals who hold this view acknowledge that water services 
provide an attractive opportunity for private investors (statement 21), but they hold that water services 
should be provided by full public ownership firms (statement 30). 
The third factor can be called   a   ‘pragmatist’   view  of local water services regulation. Individuals 
who hold this view acknowledge that the water services should be managed according to principles of 
solidarity and of protection of the most vulnerable users (statement 2) and agree with the policy that 
water tariffs should be kept under the control of public authorities to ensure affordability (statement 4). 
However, they also admit that water tariff should cover full cost, including a fair return to capital 
invested (statement 4). They are generally sceptical of the role of business firms in the provision of 
local water services irrespective to whether firms are subjected to terms and conditions of franchise 
contracts (statement 27) or to the pressure of market competition (statement 25) and of the possibility 
that local public authorities can be captured by water firms to serve their interests rather than those of 
the users (statement 7). The following comment provides an illustration of this view: 
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“Water   is   a   common   good,   therefore   the   management of water services cannot contradict this 
absolute principle. The management of water services should be effective and efficient as in the best 
business companies, but with the constraint to protect  weakest  users”  (respondent  No.  4) 
The fourth factor can be called a “cautious privatiser” view of local water services regulation. 
Individuals who hold this view agree that water infrastructure development should be primarily 
financed by user charges (statement 5), but, as water services should be managed according to 
principles of solidarity and of protection of the most vulnerable users (statement 2), water tariffs 
should be kept under the control of public authorities to ensure affordability (statement 4). Holders of 
this view, however, believe that local public authorities do not adequately monitor service quality 
(statement 10) and that in the water sector we lack reliable and comparable measures to assess the 
quality of services (statement 16). They also disagree that water services should be manager according 
to business principles akin to those of for-profit firms (statement 1) and that water firms are inherently 
inefficient because they are monopolists (statement 18). They also tend to disagree that water firms do 
not completely comply with contractual obligations of franchise contracts (statement 9). 
Finally, the fifth factor can be called a “fatalist privatiser” view of local water services regulation. 
Individuals who hold this view agree that local water services should be provided by mixed  
public-private ownership firms (statement 28) or by business firms subjected to the discretion of a 
regulatory agency (statement 26). They see, in fact, that local water services provide an attractive 
opportunity for private investors (statement 21). With rather fatalistic tones, however, they also hold 
that water firms are not exposed to any serious threat of new entrants into the industry (statement 20), 
that local public authorities do not possess adequate knowledge, competences, and capabilities to 
regulate the conduct of water firms (statement 13), and that they rather care more about protecting the 
interests of water firms than of the users (statement 7). An illustration of this view is provided by the 
following comment: 
“Water   goods   must   be   protected   by public authorities but the contribution of private capital is 
needed for an effective management, development and distribution. Mixed ownership firms would 
enable to implement this model. It would be possible to attain the same results also with a full public 
ownership firm, but national politics have largely disappointed us, and therefore we need for a  
public-private partnership in order to provide incentives (to water firms), provided that there is no 
collusion  between  public  and  private  actors”  (respondent No. 9). 
The five types of views about the regulation of local water services constitute tentative 
interpretations of sets of beliefs and opinions of the elected public officers in coherent wholes. The 
interpretations clearly require some amount of flexibility for accommodating apparently unrelated 
claims into meaningful arguments. The five types of view that resulted from the analysis, in fact, can 
not be easily mapped onto simplistic categories of “advocates” and “opponents” of re-regulation and 
privatisation of local water service provision. Rather than “advocates” of re-regulation and 
privatisation, the analysis led to the identification of “pragmatists” (who may embrace re-regulation 
and privatisation for practical benefits), “cautious privatisers” (who may half-heartedly accord 
privatisation while maintaining forms of public control on the provision of local water services), and 
“fatalist privatisers” (who may passively accept privatisation as inevitable). Rather than “opponents” 
of re-regulation and privatisation, the types of view identified from the analysis include a distinction 
between a “public sector interventionist” perspective (whose proponents believe of the merits of full 
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public ownership and control of water utilities) and a “pessimistic” perspective (whose holders rather 
criticise re-regulation and privatisation in place of advocating for any particular alternative). The five 
types of views, therefore, are not plainly correspondent to a priori categories as they rather relate to 
particular combinations of beliefs and opinions. 
A first question arises, then, concerning what explains the apparent heterogeneity of views about 
the regulation of local water services among elected public officers in Italy. A tentative answer can be 
formulated by taking into consideration the historical context of the study. As briefly recalled above, 
the water sector of Italy was shaken by various reforms and legislative changes that took place over a 
period of almost two decades (1994–2011), with the resulting effect that differences emerged in the 
modes of governance, regulation, and service delivery across the country. The variety of individuals’ 
subjectivities identified in the present study may be related to the diversity of partisan views towards 
privatisation of local water services and towards the desirability of alternative regulatory systems and 
ownership structures, which may be related to the particular trajectories of re-regulation and 
privatisation experienced at the local level. Far from developing a “hegemonic” perspective, the 
discourse on the regulation and ownership structure of water utilities in Italy remained fragmented into 
diverse views held within political circles that either endorsed regulatory reform and privatisation or 
resisted them. Variety of initial conditions, political orientation, and occurrence of reform or 
legislative changes—among others—count as relevant factors for explaining the diversity of 
individuals’  subjectivities on the regulation of local water service provision. 
Next question, then, is whether and how findings from this study—namely, the variety of views 
about regulation of local water services in Italy—matters, both within the context of the discussion 
about the regulation of the water sector in the country and of the design of water regulatory systems 
more generally. The presence of fragmented views about the regulation of water services in Italy poses 
some sources of potential instability within the present water regulatory regime. Within both the 
governance and regulatory regimes in place where water utilities are fully owned and controlled by 
local governments and where they are jointly owned by local governments and private operators and 
investors, some influential actors—elected public officers—hold believes and opinions that are 
dissonant, or even run against, the present mode of water service regulation and delivery. Implications 
of such diverse set of views about water regulation include the possibility that these actors can be 
especially sensitive to detect possible sources of discredit of the present regime (such as poor water 
service performance or dissatisfactory distributional effects of water service provision) and to frame 
the policy issue of how local water regulation should be reconfigured. 
In a broader perspective, findings from this study also bear some relevance for the general 
discussion about the design of water regulatory systems. Evidence of the variety of ideas about the 
regulation of local water services suggests that individuals’   beliefs and opinions may be related to 
particular value premises, pragmatic concerns, and opportunistic considerations rather than to mere 
adherence to shared understanding of principles of economic regulation. If ideas matter in the policy 
process, then variety of beliefs and opinions held by elected public officers may help accounting for 
the features of the design of water regulatory systems. For instance, pragmatic concerns may induce 
individuals to welcome the opening of the water industry to private operators and investors as a way to 
stimulate efficiency and financial self-sufficiency of water utilities on the one hand, and to restrain the 
conduct of water utilities through stringent regulatory measures intended to protect weakest users on 
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the other one. The design of water regulatory systems, therefore, should be understood on the basis of 
the specific conditions that occur within given historical and political circumstances, including the 
variety of individual views about how water services should be regulated. 
Finally, findings from this study may bear some relevance for other research works on the 
institutional features of water governance, especially in comparative perspective. Works done by 
Araral [16], and Araral and Yu [60], for example, argue that the design of appropriate governance 
systems for water service provision is important for improving service quality and that the quality of 
water governance seems related to the level of economic development. The present study suggests that 
paying attention to individual subjectivities may be relevant to account for similarities and differences 
of water governance systems across countries. Q methodology, as employed in this study, could help 
identifying the features of the discourse on water regulation and privatisation in different country case 
contexts. The characteristics of such discourse—in terms of both structure and variety of views held by 
individuals of the water policy domain—may be important to explain part of the observed variance of 
water governance systems across countries, especially developing ones with respect to industrialised ones. 
6. Conclusions 
This study provides an analysis of the subjectivities of elected public officers towards the regulation 
of local water services in Italy. By using Q methodology, the study showed that there are five different 
sets of beliefs and opinions held by elected public officers about how local water services are 
delivered, how well they perform, and how they should be regulated. One set of ideas, called “public 
sector interventionists”, are favourably inclined towards full public ownership of water firms and an 
influential role played by public authorities in the management of water services more generally. 
Another set of ideas, called a “pessimistic” view, primarily agrees on the presence of various problems 
in the regulation of local water services but is relatively uncommitted to any articulated policy 
approach. One more set of ideas, called a “pragmatic” view, aims at reconciling contrasting objectives, 
such as managing water firms in a business-like fashion while retaining concern with issues of water 
tariff affordability, within a common policy approach. Finally, two more sets of ideas tend to support 
some form of privatisation of water services. In the “cautious privatiser” variant, ideas include the 
need for public control of water charges and awareness of issues related to lack of attention of local 
public authorities towards monitoring service quality and of reliable and comparable measures to 
assess the quality of services. In the “fatalist privatiser” variant, ideas include awareness of various 
shortcomings of privatisation schemes, such as the lack of adequate knowledge, competences, and 
capabilities of local public authorities to regulate the conduct of water firms, the lack of threat of new 
entrants into the industry, and the somehow cynical view that local public authorities care more about 
protecting the interests of water firms than of the users. 
This study contributes enriching our understanding of ideas about the regulation of local water 
services in ways that transcend more conventional categories of modes of regulation of infrastructure 
services. A result of the analysis that is relevant, in this respect, is that individuals hold idiosyncratic 
sets of ideas about how local water services are delivered, how well they perform, and how they 
should be regulated that contain particular “nuances”. For example, “pragmatists” strive to 
compromise between social concerns on the one hand, and the need to adequately finance the 
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management of water services and the development of water infrastructure on the other one. This 
finding is consistent with those of other works that highlighted that regulatory policies sometimes take 
the shape of “hybrids” by combining selected features of alternative regulatory models [31,61]. This 
study suggests that analysing the ideas on the regulation of local water services is important in order to 
contribute to the efforts to understand the origins of the design of regulatory systems. 
If elected public officers play any role in the design of water regulatory systems at the local level, 
then this study shows that attention to the beliefs and opinions held by these individuals may be 
especially relevant. The interpretive approach to regulation can complement theoretical arguments put 
forward by the “public interest” and the “capture” theories in ways that highlight the importance of 
taking the variety of individuals’   views into account for explaining how regulations are made and 
implemented. With respect to the “public interest” theories of regulation, the inquiry into the 
subjectivities of elected public officers suggests that individuals may hold quite diverse understanding 
and attitudes towards ways to attain public objectives. With reference to the “capture” theories of 
regulation, this study suggests that elected public officers may hold reservations towards the 
privatisation of water service provision, which may entail the presence of an inclination to potentially 
reconsider—if not to revoke—the award of concession or franchise contracts under changed political 
circumstances. A similar argument could be made, moreover, about the role of individual subjectivities 
within mechanism design theories of infrastructure regulation [13]. Mechanism design theory holds 
that fitting incentive structures can minimise transaction costs in the provision of infrastructure 
services. The study of individuals’   subjectivities suggests, however, that we can not rule out the 
possibility that, while conforming their conduct to canons of instrumental rationality, individuals may 
nevertheless hold reservations about the institutional arrangement despite of any apparent net benefits, 
especially if the design principles or effects do not conform to individuals’  values. Additional issues 
arise, then, concerning whether designed mechanisms are exposed to the threat of being dismantled or 
whether any design effort should include ways to safeguard mechanisms from being taken apart. 
Finally, this study enables us to reflect upon the possibilities offered by Q methodology as well as 
its limitations. On the one hand, Q methodology provides researchers with a rigorous and transparent 
way for collecting  and  analysing  data  on  individuals’  subjectivities. On the other one, the methodological 
approach exhibits some weaknesses especially because the results are dependent on the selection of 
sentences of the Q sample, which may be affected by practical considerations for the limited amount of 
time and effort that respondents are willing to spend on the sorting task, and ultimately on the 
subjective interpretation of the researcher. In addition, the Q method is limited to providing the 
mapping of the beliefs and opinions held within the discourse on water regulation and privatisation. 
Questions about whether and how subjectivities matter for the formation of regulatory and 
privatisation policies or for the performance effects of water governance systems can not be addressed. 
Additional research is needed, therefore, to explore how findings from Q methodology may be 
fruitfully combined with other approaches in order to improve our understanding of the determinants 
of the design and performance effects of water governance systems. 
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